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We humans are incurably rooted in the temporal point of  view. 
The eternal’s ways are utterly unlike our ways.
  —William James, A Pluralistic Universe1
Much effort to wrestle the present into some serviceable political 
coherence oscillates between the poles of  the all-is-new and 
nothing-has-changed dichotomy, complicating the task of  
knowing what difference a critical intervention might make.
  —Randy Martin, An Empire of  Indifference2
I want to ride my bicycle / I want to ride it where I like.
   —Queen, “Bicycle Race”3
Introduction
In William James’s world and ours, the bicycle is a toy, sport, and mode of  
transportation, and, in each instance, ideological. Bicycle culture, like Jamesian 
pluralism, shifts our attention from class relations to contradictions arguably 
caused by class relations. We may recall how James struggled with determinism 
throughout his intellectual life, yet it was only near the end of  his career that 
he confronted that contradiction head-on with pluralized Hegelian monistic 
idealism: “[The absolute] knows me and my suffering, but it doesn’t itself  
suffer.”4 James felt the weight of  social Darwinism as it naturalized race and 
class relations, and pluralism was his attempt, in part, to restore spirituality, 
morality, and personal responsibility to a world ostensibly “red in tooth and 
claw.”5 James’s pluralism was pragmatic, inclusive, and open-ended given that 
it drew “utility out of  multiplicity” and permitted a “community of  like- and 
unlike-minded selves.”6 But was it fair?
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Such an exorcism via pluralism is worth noting for at least two reasons. 
First, the individuated, experiential metaphysics in Jamesian pluralism is a 
kind of  liberal thinking that prefigures our current politics of  affect, the “feel 
good” radicalism that brings rights, relativism, and accountability but leaves 
class relations intact. Second, the pragmatism in pluralism forces a secular and 
personalized spirituality onto daily life so that risk management (everything 
from student loans to the Patriot Act) can mobilize debt, fear, and “shiny, 
happy people” for capitalism.7 
Put another way, Jamesian pluralism and our politics of  affect now reside 
in what Slavoj Žižek has called the “terrifying dimension of  the pressure 
to choose.”8 Within this dimension lies an anxious freedom that summons 
an impossible injunction—“Choose as you wish, but you must choose 
correctly!”—as well as late capitalism’s many ideological displacements, 
including the commodity fetish and party loyalty. The morality demanding 
charity and human rights, to name another, is affixed to a logic of  risk that 
sustains the very inequities—surplus value/labor and imperialism—that 
make charity and rights necessary in the first place. In this sense, risk and 
affect blur the line between citizen and state, economy and nation. As Randy 
Martin explains, “Moral responsibility is equated with the ability to be a utility-
maximizing actor, forever weighing cost and benefit.”9 Is it any wonder, then, 
that “No Child Left Behind” and “Bail-out” Keynesian economics evoke a 
Socratic polis where security has replaced virtue, and the people don’t even 
know it? 
One need only look to today’s Green Culture, fast becoming global 
in scope, to grasp the extent of  this new capitalist ideology. Much like the 
earlier fitness movement, Green Culture compels “active” and “concerned” 
citizens to confront environmental destruction through enthusiastic 
participation in thriving consumption schemes (that is, those who can 
afford to participate in such schemes). Such participation, in turn, has 
citizens missing the ultimate cause in class relations. With fitness, one 
refuses the non-ideal body type that the fitness industry helps to determine 
(and that our cyber life and fast food industry arguably maintain). Green 
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Culture and the fitness movement share ideological space, and each yields 
commodity fetishes. This essay looks closely at one prescribed by both, 
the bicycle. The bicycle is emblematic of  late capitalism’s two strategies 
for obscuring class relations: affective radicalism and risk management. 
Origins
The German Baron Karl von Drais created the bicycle prototype in 1817, 
the wooden, walk-and-coast draisine or “dandy horse” (Fig. 1). Frenchmen 
Ernest Michaux and Pierre Lallement followed in the 1860s with the 
“velocipede,” including its major modification, an enlarged front wheel with 
pedals.10 British inventor James Starley, “the father of  the bicycling industry,” 
reworked the French “bone shaker” into a more comfortable, attractive ride 
called the Penny-Farthing. Sidney Aronson’s “Sociology of  the Bicycle” 
suggests that the bicycle came to the U.S. three different times in the 19th 
century, with the first two as “duds.” The third instance in 1879 brought a 
“bicycle boom,” the success largely attributed to a better wheel from England 
and then additional changes by Colonel Albert A. Pope in Boston.11 
Fig. 1. The draisine or “Dandy Horse” (Bikefix)
179
STEVEN WEXLER
BICYCLE!
The new bicycle had its enemies: horsemen and their carriages, teamsters, 
pedestrians, and clergymen, the latter of  who felt that bicycling on Sundays 
dangerously drew people from the Church to the countryside.12 But beyond 
these obstacles, the bicycle was shrouded in sanguinity as a cure for illnesses, 
such as “rheumatism, indigestion, alcoholism, anaemia, gout, liver trouble, 
and ‘nerves,’” enjoyable exercise, and a means to transcend patriarchy.13 As 
for the latter, safety bicycles had made cycling a “general pastime” for all, 
and the innovative drop frame allowed women to defy tradition14 (Fig 2). 
Already energized by a nascent suffragist movement, women took advantage 
of  the demand for new attire: “the bolder among the sex easily adapted their 
dress to cycling by shortening their skirts, shockingly exposing their ankles to 
view.”15 Bloomers on bicycles caused more than a stir in 1894, and Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton herself  was quite enthusiastic: “Many a woman is riding to the 
suffrage on a bicycle.”16
Fig. 2. The Safety Bicycle (Stuhr)
180
STEVEN WEXLER
BI
CY
CC
LE
!
By the mid-1890s, the bicycle translated into a hundred-million-dollar 
industry, with Americans spending an estimated fifty million dollars per year 
on bicycles and equipment.17 The finished product represented modern 
decentralized manufacturing through a number of  factories, workers, and 
contractors. The bicycle’s assembly line standardization influenced Henry 
Ford’s, while its overall popularity (“velocipede mania”) stimulated an 
emergent participatory culture.18
Today in the West the bicycle remains popular, with sales reaching 18.5 
million in the U.S. alone for the 2008 year. Bikes Belong Coalition reports 
that the salubrious cycle “may be as good or better for your health than 
regular exercise.”19 Bassett et al. found that countries with the highest 
level of  walking, bicycling, and public transit transportation had the lowest 
obesity rates.20 The U.S. Department of  Health and Human Services reminds 
us that active youth “have a better chance of  healthy adulthood” and 
advises that children participate in bicycling as a form of  “moderate” and 
“vigorous” aerobic activity; youngsters should bicycle or walk to school when 
appropriate.21
In the East, where some nations such as China are only now said to 
be entering their “Automobile Age,” the bicycle marks necessity and class 
identity, the “clash between new and old.”22 One finds fair representation of  
this dialectical relation in Wang Xiaoshuai’s 2001 Beijing Bicycle, a beautiful film 
inspired by Vittorio De Sica’s Ladri di biciclette (The Bicycle Thieves). In Beijing 
Bicycle a migrant worker Guei has his bicycle stolen from him the day he is to 
purchase it from his employer. Guei cannot work without a bicycle. A little 
later, a more privileged Jian buys the bicycle from a secondhand dealer. The 
film depicts Guei and Jian’s ensuing entanglements including a fight with a 
gang that ultimately, if  briefly, brings the protagonists together. The viewer sees 
class division in post-Mao China through their juxtaposition: Jian represents 
China’s new, upwardly mobile citizen for whom the bicycle is foremost about 
status and play; Guei, the migrant worker, is destitute and desperate without 
his sole means of  transportation. This bond between commodity and subject 
is a far cry from the first Chinese cyclists in the 1890s who were by and large 
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wealthy and educated. Responding to orientalist alienation from their travels 
and connections abroad, these early riders took to the bicycle to display their 
“progressive cultural orientation in public.”23 
The bicycle’s “staying power” in post-Mao China is “a reminder that most 
of  China’s 1.3 billion people have yet to make it into the middle class.”24 Much 
like the fictional Guei, China’s migrants participate in China’s “free market” 
largely as spectators. Louisa Schein has posited a migrant “commodity envy” 
that speaks to the workers’ growing awareness of  transnational capital and 
their inability to reap the “benefits.” Schein asks, “How can we make sense 
of  a rich culture of  consumerism not commensurable with the exchange 
practices of  acquiring commodities for money?”25 One answer is that the 
75-percent who don’t actually purchase commodities nevertheless participate 
in the commodities’ fetishization; the “window shopping” spectacle in 
China’s new shopping malls and cityscapes works circularly to accelerate 
China’s globalism, the demand for consumerism and increase in commodity 
production itself. Guei, then, is no exaggeration. The bicycle has enabled 
many migrants “to make the great leap from countryside to the city,” but 
what is otherwise a toy for a rising capitalist class is a means of  survival for 
the majority.26 
Toys for Tots, Bikes for Globality
As a toy, the bicycle works retroactively to take hold of  the childhood 
imaginary and secure adult participation in capitalist schemes. Roland Barthes 
illuminated the ideology in toys—“a microcosm of  the adult world”—when 
he suggested that toys shape us early on so that we might thrive in scripted 
adult roles.27 His thesis now appears commonsensical if  somewhat dated: 
girls play with dolls so that they will become good mothers, relegated to the 
household; boys play with blocks to become captains of  industry, profitable 
innovators, and so on. Barthes reasoned that modern toys represent late 
capitalism’s demand for consumers rather than producers. Where the original 
Lincoln Logs and Tinker Toys required active imagination and participation 
from their young owners, today’s mechanical toys, such as dolls that cry, 
nurse, and perform other bodily functions on their own, diminish a child’s 
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creative agency. The transformation from wood toys to plastic is therefore 
telling: new plastic toys mark a deliberate distancing from a “warm,” evolving 
nature to a “cold,” static industry; wood wears out and plastic breaks down. 
If  one takes Barthes’s thesis seriously, couldn’t new toys, like a calamitous 
world war, be a strategy to solve overproduction? 
Fig 3. Child and Bike (Sustrans)
The bicycle-as-toy, however, is not new, and it is precisely because cycling 
operates in an ideology of  nostalgia and naturalness, e.g., a desire to return 
to nature, that the toy serves late capitalism so well. Green Culture demands 
that we focus on global warming—a secondary contradiction—and miss 
class relations—the primary contradiction. The bicycle accomplishes this 
masking of  class by literally and figuratively pedaling riders toward ascetic 
distanciation: the toy bicycle prepares young citizens for anxious adult consumption of  
physical fitness and environmental concern. The carefree, obedient child unwittingly 
obeys the injunction to enjoy so the physically fit, environmentally responsible 
adult will fail to see class. The onus is on the parent(s) to ensure that this risk 
management (i.e., the futurism that forces tomorrow’s concerns into/onto 
the present) takes hold in childhood (Fig. 3). 
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Given the range and complexity of  the bicycle’s ideology, it is worth 
better defining our terms. Žižek’s recent delineation of  “populist-fascist 
fetishism” and “permissive-cynical fetishism” is particularly helpful here.28 
Populist-fascist fetishism involves the “false identification of  both the nature 
of  the antagonism and the enemy,” so that one blames X rather than Y. 
Žižek example is characteristically provocative: Nazi anti-Semitism is really 
the Nazi fear of  communism displaced onto the Jews. Such an account of  
fetishization, of  course, begs the question: Is every instance of  anti-Semitism 
in every epoch a fetishization? For our purposes here, however, “populist-
fascist fetishism” could explain how individuals mistake the source of  
environmental destruction as the “human race,” read succinctly as “individual 
indulgences,” rather than capitalism and its (by)products, e.g., automobile 
industry and industrial pollution. Same with fitness: whether it’s a stationary 
lifestyle or overeating, the enemy is typically our individual choices rather 
than the capitalism behind individual.
Permissive-cynical fetishism on the other hand has universality masking 
inequity, e.g., “Everyone has rights, so hands off  my business [exploitation]!” 
To be sure, this fetishism extends from household microeconomics to laissez-
faire national policy. It may be worth noting that this universality, abstracted 
onto daily life, is seen by many theorists as one of  late (monopoly) capitalism’s 
organizing principles. This is not the place to go into the vast amount of  work 
done on the subject of  late capitalism, but a brief  definition would include 
post-Fordism’s flexible or casual labor and the many “non-productive” labor 
strategies employed as a response to the over accumulation and concentration 
of  capital since World War II, e.g., “service economy,” “knowledge 
economy,” and managerialism. Harry Braverman made the point effectively: 
“institutionalization of  capital and the vesting of  control in a specialized 
stratum of  capitalist class corresponds chronologically to an immense 
growth in the scale of  management operations.”29 Likewise, in his discussion 
of  Michel Aglietta’s regulation theory, Paul Smith speaks of  capitalism’s 
ability to integrate citizenry into an “economic expansion of  the means of  
consumption.”30 Such integration resonates with the abstract universality in 
Žižek’s notion of  permissive-cynical fetishism since the integration of  the 
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citizenry works by limiting a subject’s “scope.”31 According to Smith, “[S]
ubjects need to be called into place and kept there in order to achieve the 
transformation to a new regime of  accumulation.” False universality is 
interpellative, and the subject’s absorption into global consumption scheme 
signals an effective dialectical relation between economic processes and 
everyday life, a relation which does not simply construe cultural and civic 
life as a superstructural byproduct of  economic processes but which regards 
those realms as part of  a structured whole wherein capital’s relation to labor 
power is the shifting focal point of  all transformations.32 
For Smith, then, “everyday life” is as determining as the relations of  
production. Göran Therbon’s work on ideology makes similar moves in 
its privileging of  the superstructural, e.g., “If  a contradiction develops 
between the relations and forces of  production, no ideological formation can 
adequately and harmoniously subject-qualify the new economic subjects for 
the contradictory order.”33
Pedaling Past Class 
 While it is tempting to redefine the superstructural so as to give 
culture equal weight and causality as class, these changes, e.g., Fordism to 
flexible labor, do not reflect human-free ways to create value and often 
have us missing the fact that factory work endures; that is to say, shifting 
and concentrating capital is not the same thing as producing profit. Social 
relations indeed give rise to the means of  production, e.g., technology (rather 
than the reverse), yet one should see “social relations” as owners and workers 
not “everyday life.” For David Harvey, Frank Webster, and others debunking 
“new working class” theories, “these changes, when set against the basic rules 
of  capitalistic accumulation, appear more as shifts in surface appearance 
rather than as signs of  the emergence of  some entirely new postcapitalist or 
even postindustrial society.”34 What is significant here is that Žižek’s populist-
fascist fetishism and permissive-cynical fetishism do not try to rewrite cause 
and effect but rather illuminate the abstract universality of  environmentally 
friendly “global” citizens on bikes as well as the demonizing of  stationary, 
“indulgent” lifestyles. 
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It is perhaps not so surprising that an ideology of  “responsible citizen”—
green conscious and physically fit—begins in childhood, working on us by 
means of  abstract universality. But what makes this abstraction specific to 
late capitalism and worth noting is that the ideology coincides perfectly with 
financial logic, that is, with our current finance regime. Risk management 
and securitization appropriate “green and fit” affective radicalism in two 
ways: first, through nostalgia that encourages the backward glance towards 
a pre-industrialized, friendlier planet and/or a younger version of  one’s self  
(which in most cases is a better and happier body); and second, with the 
construction of  youth itself. Much like their portfolio-wielding and debt-
driven adult counterparts, children are either seen as capable of  taking risks 
(that is, securely “at-level” or “advanced level”) or “at risk.” This strategy 
is nothing more than a micromanaging of  futures that guarantees children 
will function as manageable adults. As Martin suggests, “So much for the 
winsome days of  youth.”35
The import of  risk management and affective radicalism is clear: 
liberalism not only obscures class relations through democracy, freedom, and 
rights, but through environmental concern and physical fitness. What is at 
work here is neopragmatic posturing that energizes our Jamesian pluralism 
so that “agency,” “responsibility,” and “difference” are united under abstract 
universality and accepted fanatically as outside class relations. One, then, sees 
the potential problem with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s triumphant 
cry, “[We want] a world in which race and gender do not determine hierarchies 
of  power, a world in which differences express themselves freely.”36 Such 
occluding of  class is a simultaneous throwback to expressionist logic and 
a leap toward flexible citizenry. It is as Engels once observed about the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, that these strategies are 
the very “pillars upon which [capitalists] raise their social edifice above the 
ruins of  injustice, inequality, and privilege.”37 Today’s radicalism, like Jamesian 
totality, offers a universe of  agency and difference but not real change. You 
can bike on it.
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